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NOTES

NORTH DAKOTA IMPLIED CONSENT: AN HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW AND MODERN ADAPTATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION
In response to problems with intoxicated motorists, state
legislatures have adopted statutes implying the consent of one who
drives on the highways to submit to some kind of scientific test. The
apparent objective of the legislatures in adopting implied consent
statutes has been to provide a means for determining the bloodalcohol content of persons who are suspected of being under the
influence of intoxicating beverages while operating a motor vehicle
on a public highway. 1 In the 1950s a number of states began to
adopt implied consent statutes to attain that objective. 2 At the
present time, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have some
type of implied consent statute. 3 Most of these statutes have been
1. SeeTimm v. State, 110 NW.2d 359 (N.D. 1961). In Timm the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated the following: "The object of the Legislature in enacting Section 39-20-01 was clearly to
determine the alcoholic content of the blood of persons who are suspected of operating motor vehicles
upon the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating beverages." Id. at 364.
2. New York was the first state to adopt any type ofimplied consent statute. 1953 N.Y. Laws ch.
854 (current version at N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW S 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1981)).
3. ALA. CODE § 32-5-192 (1977); ALASKA STAT. 5 28.35.031 (1978); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
28-691 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 75-1045 (1979); CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353 (West Supp. 1981);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (West Supp. 1981);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2740 (1979); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 40-1002 (West Supp. 1978); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 322.261 (West 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 68A-902.1 (1980); HAWAIi REV. STAT. § 286151 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 49-352 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95.5, § 11-501.1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-4-4.5-1 (Burns 1980); IowA CODE ANN. § 321B.3 (West Supp.
1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. 5186.565 (1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 32:661 (West Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, S 1312 (Supp. 1981); MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 16-205.1 (Supp. 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, S 24(l)(f) (West Supp. 1981); MICH.
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accepted since the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Schmerber v. Californiain 1966.4 Yet, many questions concerning the
constitutionality of the statutes and their administration remain.
Because each state's implied consent statute differs, a variety of
constitutional strengths and weaknesses can be found within each
state's provision.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the impact of
constitutional challenges to the modern implied consent statutes
and to evaluate North Dakota's existing implied consent statute,
enumerate its deficiencies, and suggest measures of reform to the
legislature and the courts. First, the general theory and
constitutionality of the typical implied consent statute will be
examined. 5 Particular attention will be paid to frequently occurring
questions regarding these statutes. Second, a close review of the
North Dakota implied consent statute 6 will be made. In this review,
deficiencies that currently exist in the North Dakota implied
consent statute will be examined and needed changes will be
recommended.
II. THE THEORY OF IMPLIED CONSENT
A typical implied consent statute provides that any person
operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of the state shall be
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625c (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (West Supp. 1981); Miss. CoDF.

ANN. § 63-11-5 (West Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.020 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 61-8-402 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.383 (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 262-A:69-a (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 66-8-107 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW S 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-16.2 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1
(Page Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, S 751 (West Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 487.805
(1979); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(a) (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (Supp.
1981); S.C. CODE § 56-5-2950 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10 (1976); TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 55-10-406 (Supp. 1981); TEX. REV. Cir. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 (Vernon 1977); UTAH CODEANN. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202 (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-268 (Supp.
1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (1974); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 343.305 (West Supp. 1981); Wvo. STAT. § 31-6-102 (Supp. 1981).
4. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber the United States Supreme Court set forth guidelines for i
constitutional analysis of a motorist's blood under an implied consent law. The Court held that the
taking of blood did not violate the fourth, fifth, sixth, or fourteenth amendments. Schmerbvr v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-61, 766, 772 (1966).
5. This discussion will be based on the statute promulgated by the Uniform Vehicle Code
(U.V.C.). See U.V.C. § 6-205.1 (1971 revised version; 1979 version). Many states have adopted
statutes similar to the U.V.C. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(a) (West Supp. 1981); OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1981); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 (Vernon 1977).
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1980). The current version of North Dakota's implied consent
law provides in part as follows:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall
be deemed to have given consent subject to the provisions of this chapter to a chenical
test, or tests, of his blood, breath, saliva, or urine for the purpose of determining the
alcoholic content ofhis blood.
Id.
North Dakota first adopted an implied consent law in 1959. See1959 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 286.
§1.
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deemed to have given consent to a test or tests of his blood, breath,
or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol content of his
blood. 7 The test is to be administered if a person is arrested for any
offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while
the person was driving under the influence of alcohol. 8
Several theories have been advanced to support implied
consent statutes. Two theories are most frequently argued. The
first involves the concept that driving is a privilege rather than a
right. 9 Since this privilege is granted subject to certain terms and
conditions, it may be revoked if those terms and conditions are not
met. 0 This concept is embodied in implied consent laws that give
the motorist a choice of either submitting to a blood-alcohol test or
refusing to submit to a test. A refusal automatically results in
revocation of driving privileges within the state.
The second theory frequently used to support implied consent
laws is that they are a reasonable exercise of the state's police
power. 1 The rationale of this theory is that the state's interest in
7. Many states have adopted statutes patterned after the Uniform Vehicle Code. See U.V.C.
5 11-902.1, 6-205.1 (1971 revised version; 1979 version). The U.V.C. provides in part as follows:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State
shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of § 11-902.1, to a
chemical test or tests of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the
alcoholic or drug concentration of his blood or breath if arrested for any offense arising
out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drugs.
Id, § 6-205.1.
8. Id. 5 6-205. 1.
9. Mauldin v. State, 239 Md. 592, 212 A.2d 502 (1965). The Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a motion to strike blood test evidence of a motorist charged with manslaughter was properly
refused and stated the following:
It has been held that the State may constitutionally require the taking of such a test as
a prerequisite to the privilege of using the roads. Walton v. City ofRoanoke, 204 Va. 678,
133 S.E.2d 315; Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765; State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296,
328 P.2d 1065; Prucha v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75, Anno.
Suspension or Revocation of Driver's License for Refusal to Take Sobriety Test, 88
A.L.R.2d 1064. See also, Touchton v. State (En Banc), 154 Fla. 547, 18 So.2d 752; State
v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435; Wells v. State, 239 Ind. 415, 158 N.E.2d 256, 258.
Id. at __,212 A.2d at 504.
10. Gableman v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 379 (N.D. 1974). In Gableman the North Dakota Supreme
Court stated that "all persons who refuse to submit to a chemical test are treated in the same
manner, and revocation of such persons' operator's licenses is mandatory, not discretionary, and is
not unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary." Id, at 384. See Smestad v. Ellingson, 191 N.W.2d 799
(N.D. 1971) (highway commissioner is empowered to revoke license, notwithstanding dismissal of
driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge by court without a hearing, when following a valid arrest a
highway user refuses to submit to a chemical test to determine whether he is under the influence of
alcohol); Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1961) (when highway user refused to submit to a
blood test to determine alcoholic content of his blood, highway commissioner was justified in
revoking his driver's license); Boggs v. State Department of Public Safety, 261 N.W.2d 412 (S.D.
1977) (motorist had no reason to complain about the revocation of his driver's license because the
motorist was lawfully arrested for driving while intoxicated, was advised of his rights under the
implied consent law, and refused to submit to a chemical test thereafter). See generally Comment, The
Theory and Practiceof Implied Consent in Colorado, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 723 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); Blydenburg v.
David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967); State v. Moore, 79 Wash. 2d 51, 483 P.2d 630 (1971). See also
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protecting society outweighs the rights of the individual.1" The
danger imposed by the drunk driver warrants a slight
encroachment on the rights of the individual. Thus, in considering
the two theories, courts have held that because the right to drive is a
privilege granted by the state, the state may rely upon its police
power to regulate the exercise of that privilege by reasonable
3
provisions, including implied consent laws. '
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSENT

CHALLENGES

TO

IMPLIED

The use of chemical tests to determine the blood-alcohol
14
content of motorists may be found in every jurisdiction.
Generally, the results of such tests have been held admissible as
evidence. 15 The admission of test results, however, has been subject
to constitutional objections and attacks. The major challenges have
16
been based on the fourteenth amendment due process guarantee,
the fourth amendment right not to be subjected to an unreasonable
search and seizure,1 7 the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination,' 8 and the fifth and sixth amendment rights to
20
counsel. 19 Although the decision in Schmerber v. California
upholding general implied consent laws appears to be sound, new
State v. Kouba, 319 N.W.2d 161, 163 (N.D. 1982) (citing Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359 (N.D.
1961)) (the use of public highways is a right or privilege subject to control of the state in the valid
exercise of its police power).
12. McGue v. Sillas, 82 Cal. App. 3d 799, 147 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1978). Stating that
"the public's interest in strict enforcement of traffic laws designed to eliminate drunken driving far
outweighs the right of an individual to drive," the California appellate court upheld the revocation of
appellant's license after appellant refused to submit to a chemical test. Id. at __,
147 Cal. Rptr. at
356-57. The court stated that the right to drive was not a fundamental right and the public's interest
in strict enforcement of traffic laws designed to eliminate drunken driving far outweighed the rights
of appellant to drive. Id. at __,
147 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
13. See State v. Kouba, 319 N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 1982). In Kouba the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that no inalienable right to drive on public highways exists in North Dakota. Id. at 163.
See also Burns v. Department of Public Safety, 328 So. 2d 819 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (plaintiff's license
suspension for driving while intoxicated was not a denial of liberty or a taking of property without
due process of law); Berger v. Department of Public Safety, 327 So. 2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (the
right to drive is a privilege granted by the state, and the state may impose such reasonable conditions
thereon as it may see fit).
14. See supra note 3.
15. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). After the defendant's arrest for driving while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a blood sample was withdrawn by a physician at the
direction of a police officer, acting without a search warrant, despite the defendant's refusal to
submit to a blood test. Id. at 758. The results of the test were admitted at trial and the defendant was
convicted. Id. at 759. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction holding that the defendant's rights
had not been violated by the compulsory blood test. Id. at 760-72. See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352
U.S. 432 (1957) (evidence concerning the results of petitioner's blood test, performed while
petitioner was unconscious, was admissible over an objection that the taking of the blood constituted
conduct that shocked the conscience and offended a sense ofjustice).
16. 384 U.S. at 759.
17. Id. at 766.
18. Id. at 760.
19. Id. at 765-66.
20. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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one of the above amendments are not

A. DUE PROCESS

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
that no state shall make or enforce any law that deprives any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 21 Although
the due process clause guidelines are indefinite and vague, 22 judges
may not merely draw on their personal and private ideas of
fairness. 2 3 The traditional notions of decency and fairness, woven
by the whole community, must be the guide for a due process
24
decision.
Evidence obtained through a disregard for those notions of
decency and fairness may not be used in court. 25 The United States
Supreme Court, in Rochin v. California,26 held that obtaining
narcotics evidence through the forcible extraction of the contents of
the defendant's stomach was a violation of the constitutional
standards of due process. 27 The Court found that the conduct of the
officers was such that it "shocked the conscience ' 28 and offended
the sense of justice to the point of requiring a reversal of the
29
conviction on constitutional grounds.
The due process concept was relied upon in later cases to
determine whether the conduct used to obtain evidence was too
rough and severe. 30 In Breithaupt v. Abram3' the United States
Supreme Court used the due process concept in determining the
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
22. For a critical examination of the requirements of due process, see Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952). The Rochin Court held that "[d]ue process of law, as a historic and generative
principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than
to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice.' " Id. at
173.
23. Id.at 170.
24. Id. at 169.
25. Id. In Rochin the Court held that obtaining narcotics evidence through forcible extraction of
contents of the defendant's stomach violated the constitutional standards and rights of due process
and the fourteenth amendment. Id.at 172-73. See also People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123,
145 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1978) (rejected evidence of trichomoniasis in semen obtained by prolonged
massage of the prostate gland, through the rectum, to induce involuntary ejaculation); People v.
Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1975) (evidence of seven balloons
containing heroin obtained by inserting a tube into defendant's esophagus through her nose held
inadmissible).
26. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
27. Rochin v.California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 173.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 377 A.2d 411 (D.C. 1977) (first-degree burglary); State v.
Ivory, 578 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1978) (first-degree robbery); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378
N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978) (sale of controlled substance); Cole v. Parr, 595 P.2d 1349
(Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (first-degree rape); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 480 Pa. 340, 390 A.2d 172
(1978) (voluntary manslaughter).
31. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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admissibility of evidence of a blood sample taken from an
unconscious motorist by a physician.3 2 Distinguishing Rochin the
Court held that the taking of the blood sample by the physician did
not offend the due process guarantee of the fourteenth
amendment.3 3 The Court did qualify its ruling, however, by
pointing out that the indiscriminate taking of blood under different
conditions or by those not qualified to do so might fall outside the
standards set out in Rochin. 3 4 Rochin and Breithaupt are therefore
distinguishable because of the difference in the conduct of the state
authorities and the amount of force used in extracting the evidence
from the defendant.
The landmark decision regarding implied consent laws and the
admissibility of blood test evidence, Schmerber v. California,35 relied
on the Breithauptdecision in determining the due process question. 36
In Schmerber the United States Supreme Court held that, although
the motorist was conscious and refused to consent to the blood test,
a withdrawal of a blood sample did not amount to such a violation
of due process as to offend the Rochin Court's "sense of justice"
standard. 37 Because no undue force was used the Court held that
the evidence had been obtained in a constitutional manner. 38 Thus,
the measuring stick appears to be the extent of the force used in
obtaining the blood sample. 39 It appears that a court, in looking at
the factual circumstances in each case, must determine whether the
evidence was obtained through a use of force forbidden by the
Rochin decision.
To prevent a violation of due process under the Rochin "sense
of justice" standard, many states provide the motorist with more
protection than is constitutionally required. Some jurisdictions
have passed legislation providing that if the motorist refuses to
32. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The Court held that a blood sample taken from
the unconscious defendant by a physician was admissible as evidence and did not violate the
standards of due process set forth in Rochin. Id. at 436-37. See People v. Brown, 174 Colo. 513, 485
P.2d 500 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 1007 (1972) (contention that implied consent law
unconstitutionally sanctions an invasion of privacy rejected because the slight intrusion of a blood
test is justified by the interests of society).
33. 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The Abram Court concluded that "a blood test taken by a skilled
technician is not such 'conduct that shocks the conscience,' . . . nor such a method of obtaining
evidence that it offends a 'sense ofjustice.' " Id. at 437.
34. ld. at 437-38.
35. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
36. Id. at 760. The Schmerber Court stated: "Breithaupt thus requires the rejection of petitioner's
due process argument, and nothing in the circumstances of this case or in supervening events
persuades us that this aspect of Breithaupt should be overruled." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. In Schmerber the Court reasoned that it would be a different case if the police initiated the
violence, refused to respect a reasonable request to undergo a different form of testing, or responded
to resistance with inappropriate force. Id. n.4.
39. See People v. Kraft, 3 Cal. App. 3d 890, 84 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1970) (due process
violated when police, to obtain a blood sample, held the motorist down on the floor with one arm
pulled behind his back).
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submit to a blood test, no test shall be given. 40 Courts have upheld
these statutory provisions and declared evidence obtained without
the motorist's consent inadmissible.4 1 It should be noted, however,
that when no legislation of this type exists, courts must determine
on a case by case basis what amount of force may be used to obtain
a blood sample.

B.

42

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The fourth amendment right against unlawful search and
seizure protects a person's privacy and dignity interests from
unwarranted instrusion by the state. 4 3 The United States Supreme
Court in Mapp v. Ohio44 held that all evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in court. 4 5 When a
search is conducted with the consent of the individual being
searched there is no violation of the fourth amendment. 46 When
there is no consent, however, the search must meet specific
requirements to avoid violation of the amendment. 47 As a result,
when evidence of a blood test taken without the consent of the
40. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. S 286-155 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. art. 10, S 8-1001
(1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 186.565 (3) (1980); MicH. CoMp. LAWs ANN. S 257.625d (West Supp.
1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205(a)(Supp. 1981).
41. See State v. Annen, 12 Or. App. 203, 504 P.2d 1400 (Ct. App. 1973) (results of blood tests
after defendant expressly refused to consent to the test were inadmissible because implied consent
statute specifically provided a right to refuse a test); State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, -,
385 A.2d
1085, 1088 (1978) (jurisdictions have "deemed fit to grant suspected intoxicated drivers more
'protection' than is constitutionally required"); State v. Ball, 123 Vt. 26, 179 A.2d 466 (1962) (blood
samples taken from motorists who are unconscious from injury or drink are not admissible as
evidence in a driving while intoxicated prosecution, unless the respondent consents). See also Bush v.
Bright, 264 Cal. App. 2d 788, 71 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1968) (the reason for police officer's
acquiescence in defendant's refusal to submit to a test was to prevent violence tied to a forcible test).
42. People v. Wren, 271 Cal. App. 2d 788, 76 Cal. Rptr. 673 (Ct. App. 1969). The court in
Wren reasoned that the implied consent statute did not preclude taking a blood test over a motorist's
refusal. Id. at __
, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (construing CAL. VEH. CODE S 13353 (West 1969)).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment provides in part that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated." Id.
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (pertaining only to
federal courts).
45. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
46. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S 218, 219 (1973) (citing Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946)). The Schneckloth Court
stated that "one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." 412 U.S. at 219. See also Chutt v.
MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, __,
127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 124-25 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (because the statute was
1 premised upon the consent of the licensee to submit to the test when demanded" and because the
motorist who was under arrest "could be searched for evidences of the crime," the blood test was not
in violation of the fourth amendment); State v. Miller, 146 N.W.2d 159 (N.D. 1966) (use of results
of breathalyzer test did not violate defendant's constitutional rights especially since defendant
consented).
47. As a general rule, a search and seizure, in the absence of consent, will be valid only when
made incident to a lawful arrest or pursuant to a search warrant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 433 (1971) (murder conviction reversed); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)
(narcotics conviction reversed); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (forgery of postage
stamps); State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1965) (leaving scene of accident).
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motorist is introduced by the prosecution, the court must decide
whether taking the blood sample was in violation of the fourth
amendment.48

Whether the police were justified in requesting the driver to
submit to a blood test is a major factor in determining the legality of
the blood test. In 1966 the United States Supreme Court in
Schmerber v. California set forth guidelines to determine whether an
implied consent test would satisfy the fourth amendment
requirements for a lawful search. 4 9 In Schmerber the Court stated
that the chemical test may be administered only after a lawful
arrest, 50 when the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the
motorist was driving while under the influence of alcohol. 51 The
test must be performed in a medically approved and reasonable
53
manner,5 2 and it must be reliable.
48. 384 U.S. at 767. In Schmerber the Court held that taking a blood sample is a search and
seizure, and in order to be valid, it must conform to the standards of reasonableness required by the
fourth amendment. Id.
49. Id. at 768-72. After the defendant's arrest for driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, a blood sample was withdrawn by a physician at the direction of a police officer
acting without a search warrant, despite the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test. Id. at 75859. The results of the test were admitted at trial and the defendant was convicted. Id. at 759. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant's rights had not
been violated by the compulsory blood test. Id. at 772. The Court held that the circumstances of an
implied consent test require an exception to the search warrant requirement because of the high
potential for dissipation of the evidence. Id. at 770-71.
50. Id. at 768-69. See Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973) (fourth amendment
requires a lawful arrest as a prerequisite to invoking the implied consent law); Otte v. State, 172
Neb. 110, 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961) (for the implied consent ofa person to be effective the person must
have been arrested or taken into custody before the test is given); Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43,
__
127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 127 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ("conferring upon police officers the right to make a
request under the guise of authority concerning one's person without specific process and without
lawful arrest clearly amounts to an unlawful infringement upon one's liberty").
Most jurisdictions have adopted the principle that a lawful arrest must precede any
administration of the implied consent law. See Asbridge v. North Dakota Highway Comm'r, 291
N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1980) (lawful arrest is a condition precedent to administration of chemical
screening test for intoxication); McDonald v. Ferguson, 129 N.W.2d 348 (N.D. 1964) (lawful arrest
is condition precedent to right of officer to demand that motorist submit to chemical tests prescribed
by implied consent law). When there is an actual consent by the motorist, however, the requirement
of prior lawful arrest is waived. State v. Seager, 178 Neb. 51, 131 N.W.2d 676 (1964) (vehicle
homicide conviction affirmed where motorist gave consent to blood test); State v. Auger, 124 Vt. 50,
196 A.2d 562 (1963) (blood analysis of driver who consented to blood test was admissible in DWI
prosecution).
51. 384 U.S. at 770. See City ofMinot v. Knudson, 184 N.W.2d 58 (N.D. 1971). In Knudson the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that a statute governing an arrest without a warrant permits a
peace officer to arrest a person for the offense of driving a vehicle while under the influence of
alcoholic beverages, so long as the peace officer has made the arrest upon reasonable cause. Id. at 64.
See also Borman v. Tschida, 171 N.W.2d 757 (N.D. 1969) (implied consent statute is complied with if
at the time of the arrest the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner had been
driving while under the influence).
52. 384 U.S. at 771-72. A showing that the implied consent test was "fairly administered" is
required to establish the foundation for admissibility of a breathalyzer test. Full proof that the device
was in good working order, that the proper chemicals were used, and that the test was given correctly
is also required. See, e.g., State v. Chylin, 222 N.W.2d 864 (N.D. 1974); State v. Salhus, 220
N.W.2d 852 (N.D. 1974), distinguishedin State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 865 (N.D. 1976). See
also People v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 757, 763, 493 P.2d 1145, 1147, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281, 283
(1972) (fourth amendment does not bar a compulsory seizure without a warrant of a person's blood
for the purposes of a blood-alcohol test to determine intoxication, provided the taking of the sample is
done in a medically approved manner).
53. 384 U.S. at 771. Evidence of procedures used to test blood-alcohol content with a
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In determining the lawfulness of the arrest, a court will look at
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the stop of the motorist
and his arrest. The fourth amendment prohibits arrest without
probable cause.1 4 When probable cause exists, however, an arrest
may properly and lawfully be made. 55 Probable cause for an arrest
may arise when the motorist exhibits the characteristics of a person
who is under the influence of alcohol. 56 Most states, then, allow a
police officer to make an arrest upon sufficient probable cause to
believe that the motorist is guilty of driving while intoxicated. 5 7
Should the police officer fail to show probable cause for the arrest
and subsequent request for a blood test, the results of such a test
will be inadmissible.5 8 It should be stressed that the officer need
only show that he had probable cause to believe the driver was
under the influence of alcohol for the arrest to be lawful. 5 9 The
officer need not show facts that would support the arrest or sustain
60
a conviction.
Generally, a search of a person made incidental to a lawful
arrest is a recognized exception to the fourth amendment
6
requirement that a search warrant be obtained prior to a search. '
The Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California held, however, that
the search incident to arrest exception is not applicable "to searches
involving intrusions beyond the body's surface. 62 The Court
reasoned that the interest in human dignity and privacy protected
by the fourth amendment forbids such intrusions when there is
breathalyzer device and of the results obtained must be accompanied by proof establishing the
accuracy of the test results obtained and indicating that the method of establishing accuracy was
scientifically acceptable. State v. Ghylin, 222 N.W.2d 864, 869 (N.D. 1974).
54. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d I (ND.
1971) (murder); State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (Ct. App. 1966), aff'd, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (concealed weapon).
55. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (the validity of a search incident to
arrest depends upon its reasonableness under all the circumstances); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925) (officer may arrest without a warrant a suspect believed by him on reasonable cause
to have been guilty of a felony); State v. Gagnon, 207 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1973) (arrest without
warrant must be on reasonable cause).
56. See, e.g., Smestad v. Ellingson, 191 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1971). In Ellingson the North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that, in a situation in which the defendant's speech was slurred, he
walked in an unsteady manner, he had difficulty responding to officer's questions, his eyes were
glazed and bloodshot, and he had a strong odor of alcohol about him, the officer had probable cause
to make the arrest. Id. at 800-01.
57. See supra note 51.
58. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by
means of search and seizure that were not reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation).
59. The fact that the officer cannot give the exact reason for stopping the motorist does not make
the arrest unlawful. The court will look at the entire activity surrounding the arrest to determine if
there was, in fact, probable cause to arrest. See State v. Landry, 116 N.H. 288, 358 A.2d 661 (1976).
60. Id. at__,358 A.2d at 664.
61. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950). The person of one who was lawfully arrested could be searched lawfully without a warrant.
Id. at 60.
62. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 769.
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merely a chance that the evidence might be procured. 6 3
However, the Schmerber court carved out a hybrid exception to
the warrant requirement. 64 The exception combines a search
incident to arrest with the emergency doctrine to allow the officer to
request a compulsory test without a search warrant. 65 The Court's
rationale was that the evidence was of such a destructible nature
that there was no time to find a magistrate and secure a search
warrant. 66 As a result of this holding, when a police officer has
probable cause to believe the motorist is under the influence of
alcohol, he may, without a search warrant, require the motorist to
67
submit to a blood test without violating the fourth amendment.
Beyond the above requirements, the administration of the
chemical test must also meet the standards of reasonableness set
forth for a valid fourth amendment search. 68 General guidelines, to
aid in the determination of whether a search by way of chemical test
is justified, may be construed from Schmerber v. California69 and
Breithaupt v. Abram. 70 A test must be highly reliable in determining
the amount of alcohol within the person's bloodstream. 7 1 It must be
fairly administered by qualified personnel, and proof of the use of
proper chemicals and of a medically approved device for
administering the chemical test is required. 72 If these standards are
not met, the court will not admit into evidence the results of the
73
blood sample obtained by the police.
The court has the responsibility of examining the facts and
circumstances surrounding the administration of a chemical test.
63. Id. at 769-70.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Court reasoned that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatened destruction
of the evidence because the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after
drinking stops. Id.
66. Id. at 77 1.
67. See Borman v. Tschida, 171 N.W.2d 757 (N.D. 1969) (motorist's actions and characteristics
observed by the police officer justified the officer's conclusion that the motorist was driving while
intoxicated and constituted probable or reasonable cause to arrest the motorist and compel him to
submit to a sobriety test).
68. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 771-72.
69. Id. The blood test was one that commonly was used and was very reliable. The procedure
involves virtually no risk or pain. The test must be administered in a reasonable manner. Id.
70. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. at 435-36. The Court reasoned that there is nothing
offensive in the taking of a blood sample by a physician. The blood test is a commonplace occurrence
in the lives of many and a blood sample taken by a physician does not, alone, violate any protection
afforded by the fourth amendment. Id.
71. SeeSchmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 771.
72. See id. at 771-72; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. at 435-36.
73. See State v. Riggins, 348 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 1977). In Riggins the defendant physically resisted
the administration of a blood test and the police attempted to take the sample by force, twisting his
broken arm. Id. at 1210. The police also threatened to take him to jail, even though he was
catheterized. Id. Although the defendant finally submitted to the blood test in protest, the results
were held inadmissible. Id. at 1211. See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 772 ("that we today
hold that the Constitution does not forbid the State's minor intrusions into an individual's body
under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions,
or intrusions under other conditions").

NOTE

Because these circumstances will differ in each case, they will
govern the court's decision concerning any fourth amendment
objection. 7 4 However, when a lawful arrest is followed by the
administration of a chemical test that satisfies the standards of
reasonableness for a valid fourth amendment search, the results of
75
the test generally will be admitted into evidence.
C.

SELF-INCRIMINATION

Another constitutional objection to chemical tests taken under
the guise of implied consent laws is that they violate the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 7 6 This privilege
allows a person in a criminal case to refuse to answer a question or
present evidence on the ground that he may be incriminated
thereby. 77 Opponents of implied consent statutes contend that
administering chemical tests to determine blood-alcohol content
violates the privilege by forcing the motorist to provide evidence
when he may want to remain silent.7 8
Courts have acknowledged that the privilege against selfincrimination may not apply to all parts of the discovery process. 7 9
The United States Supreme Court in Holt v. United States ° held that
only communicative or testimonial evidence is protected and
inadmissible under the fifth amendment. Physical or real evidence
was considered unprotected by the amendment. 81 It seems, then,
that the amendment prevents the acquisition of incriminating
evidence from a person's thoughts and ideas, but not from his
74. 384 U.S. at 772 ("we reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record"). Thus, it
appears that each situation calls for an ad hoc balancing by the court of the individual's privacy right
against the state's right to conduct a search and seizure.
75. Id.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. Id.
77. Id.
78. The motorist may be attempting to prevent the officer from obtaining evidence that surely
would convict him of DWI. In some states conviction for DWI provides for a severe fine and
imprisonment upon conviction for second and third offenses. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 147
22 a (e) (West Supp. 1981) (imprisonment of not less than sixty days for the second offense); GA.
CODE ANN. S 68A-902(c) (1981) (imprisonment of not less than ninety days for the second offense);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 5 1208(d) (1981) (revocation of driver's license for six years for the third
offense).
79. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316
(N.D. 1956).
80. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
81. Id. at 252-53. The Court stated that "the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it maybe material."
Id. The Holt Court held that testimony of a witness that the accused put on a garment and it fit him
was admissible. Id. SeeState v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958) (the privilege applies only
to testimonial compulsion and not to real evidence produced by an examination); State v. Miller, 146
N.W.2d 159 (N.D. 1966) (the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects the accused
only from being forced to testify against himself or to otherwise provide the state with evidence of
testimonial or communicative nature).
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physical characteristics or actions.
In challenging implied consent laws under the privilege
against self-incrimination the question to be resolved is whether the
results of a chemical test to determine blood-alcohol content are
inadmissible testimonial evidence or admissible physical evidence.
Again, Schmerber v. California is the deciding case. In Schmerber the
United States Supreme Court recognized the distinction between
the two types of evidence 82 and held that the results of tests
performed on a blood sample extracted from a motorist was not
evidence of a communicative or testimonial nature, but was real or
physical evidence, which was not protected 'under the privilege
83
against self-incrimination.
Since Schmerber, many state courts have held that taking a
blood test does not encroach upon a motorist's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 8 4 Similar rulings have been
86
made regarding breath tests 85 and physical or performance tests.
Because these tests yield physical rather than testimonial evidence,
they do not offend the fifth amendment guarantee against selfincrimination.
82. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 764. The Court stated that "Itihe distinction which
has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling
'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source
of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it." Id.
83. Id. at 761. The Schmerber Court held that "the privilege protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this
case did not involve compulsion to these ends." Id. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, suggesting
that the results and use of the blood test was "testimonial" or "communicative" in nature. Id. at
773-74 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
84. Various state courts have held that the withdrawal of blood in order to ascertain its alcohol
content and the receipt in evidence of the analysis report does not violate the privilege against selfincrimination. See, e.g., People v. Blandon, 194 Colo. 102, 568 P.2d 1171 (1977); Strong v. State,
231 Ga. 514, 202 S.E.2d 428 (1973); Smith v. State, 143 Ga. App. 347, 238 S.E.2d 698 (Ct. App.
1977); State v. Graham, 278 So. 2d 78 (La. 1973); People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d
584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978); People v. Craft, 28 N.Y.2d 274, 270 N.E.2d 297, 321 N.Y.S.2d 566
(1971); State v. Karbas, 28 N.C. App. 372, 221 S.E.2d 98 (Ct. App. 1976); State v. Fields, 294
N W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980).
85. See, e.g., State v. Zaragoza, 21 Ariz. App. 596, 522 P.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1974) (testimonial
privilege guaranteed by fifth amendment does not apply to breathalyzer tests); People v. Mulack, 40
Ill. 2d 429, 240 N.E.2d 633 (1968) (Miranda applies only to testimonial evidence and hence did not
extend to the breathalyzer); State v. Kenderski, 99 N.J. Super. 224, 239 A.2d 249 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1968) (breathalyzer test said to be unrelated to communicative evidence); State v. Miller, 146
N.W.2d 159 (N.D. 1966) (use of results ofbreathalyzer test did not violate defendant's constitutional
rights against self-incrimination); State v. Bunders, 68 Wis. 2d 129, 227 N.W.2d 727 (1975) (the test
being nontestimonial, Miranda is inapplicable).
86. See, e.g., State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 470, 276 A.2d 452 (1971) (not error to admit
evidence of automobile performance tests because motorist was not subject to testimonial
compulsion); People v. Krueger, 99 Ill. App. 2d 431, 241 N.E.2d 707 (App. Ct. 1968) (evidence of
physical sobriety tests held properly admitted); Rowe v. State, 157 Ind. App. 283, 299 N.E.2d 852
(Ct. App. 1973) (Miranda warnings not required prior to asking defendant to perform physical tests);
State v. Arsenault, 115 N.H. 109, 336 A.2d 244 (1975) (evidence obtained from field sobriety tests
does not violate privilege against self-incrimination); Borman v. Tschida, 171 N.W.2d 757 (N.D.
1969) (police officer may use results of physical tests, such as finger-to-nose, in determining
reasonable cause to arrest and they do not violate the fifth amendment). But seePeople v. McLaren,
55 Misc. 2d 676, 285 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 1967) (physical tests were protected by the
fifth amendment and their results should not be admissible).

NOTE

D.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

A further objection to implied consent laws has been the
possible violation of both the fifth and sixth amendment rights to
counsel. Also, some jurisdictions have held that a general state
statutory right to counsel applies to informed consent statutes.
1. Fifth Amendment Miranda Rule Applicability
Generally one accused of a crime is entitled to be advised of his
constitutional rights as a prerequisite to any questioning.8 7 The
United States Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona,8 8 set out a
number of prerequisites to the questioning of any defendant and to
the admissibility of any evidence acquired from such
questioning.8

9

These prerequisites are that the defendant must be

informed that (1) he has the right to remain silent, 90 (2) any
statement he makes can and will be used against him in a court of
law, 9 1 (3) he has the right to presence of counsel, 92 and (4) if he is
indigent a lawyer will be appointed for him.

93

The Miranda decision has had a significant impact upon
prosecutions for drunken driving and the fifth amendment right to
counsel argument. Proponents of the right to counsel have argued
that, before a chemical test may be administered pursuant to an
implied consent statute, the motorist should be given the Miranda
94
warnings.
A majority of courts, however, have held that because the
Miranda rule is grounded on the privilege against selfincrimination, which does not apply to chemical tests, 95 the Miranda
rule is not applicable to the implied consent situation. 96 The
Miranda warnings, therefore, need not be given to a motorist before
administering any chemical test. Again, this general rule has been
adopted from the United States Supreme Court's decision in
87. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The fifth amendment does not include an express
right to counsel. However, among the prerequisites outlined in Miranda is the judicially created
requirement that a defendant be informed of his right to have counsel present during questioning. Id.
at 473.
88. Id. For application to implied consent laws, see Note, Constitutional Law-Miranda's
Applicability to the Breathalyzer and Blood Tests, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 313 (1971).
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468-73.
90. Id. at 468.
91. Id. at 469.
92. Id. at 471.
93. Id. at 473.
94. See Hammeren v. North Dakota Highway Comm'r, 315 N.W.2d 679, 680 (N.D. 1982)
(person arrested for driving while intoxicated and taken into custody must be given the Miranda
warnings).
95. See State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404, 410 (N.D. 1980).
96. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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Schmerber v. California.97 In Schmerber the Court held that because the
motorist was not entitled to assert the privilege against selfincrimination, compelling him to submit to a blood test was not a
denial of his constitutional right to counsel. 98
Other courts have ruled that the Miranda warnings are not
applicable to implied consent laws for different reasons. Some
courts have held that the Miranda warnings do not apply in
misdemeanor cases9 9 or any proceedings related to motor vehicle
violations. 10 0 The reason is that these types of cases are seen as
being quasi-criminal, not criminal proceedings. 101
Although most courts have ruled that Miranda warnings need
not be given when an implied consent statute is involved,10 2 some
courts have held to the contrary. 103 These courts take a strict view
of the language in Miranda and hold that Miranda warnings must be
given. 104 Still other courts have held that the Miranda warnings are
not applicable to proceedings under implied consent laws because
they are civil in nature. 0 5
97. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 766. In Schmerber the defendant claimed that his sixth
amendment express right to counsel had been violated rather than any judicially created fifth
amendment right to have counsel present during questioning. The Court stated that the defendant
had presented no issue as to counsel's ability to assist him in the proceedings. Id. Therefore, the
logical inference is that since the defendant could not refuse the blood-alcohol test under the
California statute, presence or advice of an attorney in deciding whether to refuse the test was
irrelevant.
98. Id. at 768.
99. See, e.g., State v. Easley, 515 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (Miranda warnings are not
required in misdemeanor cases); State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969)
(constitutional rights embodied in Miranda warnings are not applicable to misdemeanors). But see
Commonwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. 452, __,
258 A.2d 675, 679 (1969) (court found no
distinction between Miranda warnings given after arrest for a felony or misdemeanor).
100. See, e.g., Warren v. State, 385 A.2d 137 (Del. 1978) (Miranda warnings not required to be
given in motor vehicle cases); State v, Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970) (Miranda warnings are
not applicable to motor vehicle violations and the giving of tests to determine sobriety); State v.
Beasley, 10 N.C. App. 663, 179 S.E.2d 820 (Ct. App. 1971) (Miranda warnings are not applicable to
all motor vehicle violations, including DWI offenses).
101. See, e.g., Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1976); State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d
792 (Iowa 1971); State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972); State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380,
226 A.2d 16 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (prosecutions under motor vehicle act are quasi-criminal);
State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970).
102. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); State v.
Lawson, 285 N.C. 320,204 S.E.2d 843 (1974).
104. Campbell, 106 Ariz. at __
, 479 P.2d at 695; Lawson, 285 N.C. at __
, 204 S.E.2d at 846.
105. See Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1974). In Agnew the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that proceedings under the implied consent law are civil in nature and refusal to submit to
a chemical test until counsel is consulted is an unreasonable refusal, there being no right to counsel in
a civil proceeding. Id. at 298. These revocation proceedings, however, are separate and distinct from
the criminal proceedings which may follow an individual's arrest for driving while intoxicated.
Asbridge v. North Dakota Highway Comm'r, 291 N.W.2d 739, 750 (N.D. 1980). Therefore, even
though the Miranda warnings must be given to a motorist arrested for driving while intoxicated in
North Dakota, there is no requirement that counsel be consulted before a decision is made whether to
submit to a blood-alcohol test. See also Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 265 Cal. App. 2d 936,
71 Cal. Rptr. 726 (Ct. App. 1968); Rusho v. Johns, 186 Neb. 131, 181 N.W.2d 448 (1970); Blow v.
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969); Deanerv. Commonwealth,
210 Va. 285, 170 S.E.2d 199 (1969).
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2. Sixth Amendment CriticalStage Analysis
In United States v. Wade10 6 the United States Supreme Court
considered the sixth amendment right to counsel argument. In
Wade the Court ruled that the presence of counsel should be
required only at "critical stages" of a proceeding. 10 7 The Court
held that preparatory steps such as scientific analysis of a
defendant's fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like
are not "critical stages" of proceedings at which time the accused
has a right to the presence of counsel: 108 The denial of the presence
of counsel at the time of such analyses would not, therefore, violate
the sixth amendment. The right to the presence of counsel applies
only when the stage of the proceeding is such that the defendant's
case may be prejudiced and the presence of counsel might help
prevent such prejudice. 109
A number of courts have used the Wade "critical stage"
analysis in determining that an implied consent blood test is not a
critical stage of the proceeding, which requires the right to
counsel.' 1 0 The concept has not been totally accepted, however, as
many courts have found that the blood test inquiry is vital to the
outcome of the defendant's rights and the case. In states that allow
the motorist to refuse to submit to the test, many courts have found
that the motorist should be allowed counsel to aid him in deciding
whether to submit to the test."' The courts have found that the
decision is such a "critical stage" of the proceeding that the sixth
amendment privilege does apply. 112 Many courts have, therefore,
106. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In Wade the United States Supreme Court held that a postindictment
lineup was a critical stage of prosecution at which the defendant was entitled to the aid of counsel.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-39 (1967).
107. Id. at 227. The Court stated that "[t]he presence of counsel at such critical confrontations,
as at the trial itself, operates to assure that the accused's interests will be protected consistently with
our adversary theory of criminal prosecution." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. In Wade a distinction was drawn between the taking of physical evidence, such as
fingerprints or blood samples, and a lineup used for identification because a defendant could refute
physical evidence by cross-examining the prosecution's expert witnesses or proferring his own
"cientific findings. A lineup, however, could interfere with the defendant's confrontation of adverse
witnesses and unduly prejudice his opportunity for a fair trial. Id. at 227-28.
110. See, e.g., Cogdill v. Department of Public Safety, 135 Ga. App. 339, 217 S.E.2d 502 (Ct.
App. 1975) (motorist had no right to counsel at the time he was asked to submit to sobriety test; it
was not a critical stage to which the sixth amendment applied); State v. Petkus, 110 N.H. 394, 269
A.2d 123 (1970) (the taking of a blood sample pursuant to the implied consent law was not a critical
stage of the criminal proceeding requiring the assistance of counsel); McNulty v. Curry, 42 Ohio St.
2d 341, 328 N.E.2d 798 (1975) (there is no constitutional right to counsel as the decision to take a
sobriety test is not a critical stage of a criminal prosecution).
111. See, e.g., People v. Sweeney, 55 Misc. 2d 793, 286 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1968) (since defendant
had the right to refuse to take the test, he should have been permitted to consult with an attorney;
distinguished Schmerber on the grounds that in California the accused has no right to refuse to submit
to a test and thus counsel would be of no assistance); Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P.2d
877 (1969) (motorist had a right to consult an attorney before making a decision to take or decline the
test).
112. See, e.g., Pickard v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 184 Neb. 573, 169 N.W.2d 460 (1969) (in
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ruled that the decision to give consent is one of those areas in which
the aid of counsel may help prevent any prejudice of the motorist's
rights.1 13 These decisions seem to be in opposition to Schmerber;
however, they involve states that give the defendant a right to
refuse, which California did not allow at the time of the Schmerber
decision. I14
Notwithstanding Schmerber, many courts and state legislatures
have given defendants the right to consult counsel prior to
submitting to the chemical test. 115 The rationales underlying this
right are varied and many decisions provide a right to counsel while
avoiding the constitutional issue. 1 6 Some courts have ruled that, as
a matter of fairness, a motorist who is asked to submit to a blood
test should be allowed to consult an attorney. 1 7
3. State Statutes
Three jurisdictions have ruled that the right to counsel is
provided by state statutes other than the specific implied consent
statute." 8 These general statutes afford any person arrested or in
view of the statutory provision that if a person refuses to submit the test shall not be given, in a
serious criminal case the request of police that defendant submit to a chemical test becomes a critical
stage in the proceedings at which time defendant may consult with an attorney); State v. Welch, 135
Vt. 316, 376 A.2d 351 (1977) (in view of statutory provisions protecting defendant's right to refuse to
take test, the request to submit was at the level of a critical stage in the proceedings and the officer's
conduct violated the motorist's right to counsel). See also State v. Duff, 136 Vt. 537, 394 A.2d 1145
(1978); City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966).
113. See, e.g., Pickard v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 184 Neb. at __,
169 N.W.2d at 460-61;
State v. Welch, 135 Vt. at __,
376 A.2d at 355.
114. See Virgin Islands v. Quinones, 301 F. Supp. 246 (D.V.I. 1969). The court reasoned that,
"using the same rationale employed by the Supreme Court in Schmerber, but with one significant
factor changed ... it is obvious that once a defendant is granted the option to refuse to submit to such
a test, the presence and advice of counsel are no longer irrelevant." Id. at 250-51. See also supra note
109.
115. See supra notes 111, 112, & 114. See, e.g., Fuller v. Department ofTransp., 275 N.W.2d 410
(Iowa 1979); Hall v. Secretary of State, 60 Mich. App. 431, 231 N.W.2d 396 (Ct. App. 1975);
Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239
N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968); Siegwald v. Curry, 39 Ohio Misc. 16, 314 N.E.2d 191
(1973), aff'd, 40 Ohio App. 2d 313, 319 N.E.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1974). See generally Comment, The
DrinkingDriver andSouth Dakota's Implied Consent - The Needfor Counsel, 23 S.D.L. REV. 403 (1978).
116. Hall v. Secretary of State, 60 Mich. App. 431, __,
231 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Ct. App.
1975). The court stated as follows: "We are not suggesting a constitutional right to counsel - we are
suggesting a reasonable due process approach to a certain set of circumstances." Id. at
-,
231
N.W.2d at 399. See also Siegwald v. Curry, 40 Ohio App. 2d 313, 319 N.E.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1974).
The court said that "[t]he right is not absolute, but may be controlled as to time and
circumstances." Id. at-,
319 N.E.2d at 384.
117. See People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 227, 239 N.E.2d 351, 352, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418
(1968). The court stated that "[a]s a matter of fairness, government ought not compel individuals to
make binding decisions concerning their legal rights in the enforced absence of counsel." Id.
(citations omitted). Seealso Hall v. Secretary of State, 60 Mich. App. 431, 231 N.W.2d 396 (Ct. App.
1975). The court in Hall stated that it "must examine the proceedings to see if they meet the due
process requirement of fundamental fairness." Id. at -, 231 N.W.2d at 398.
118. Prideaux v. Department of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976) (testing
process was a proceeding within the meaning of a statute providing that officers having a prisoner in
their custody shall upon request notify an attorney for consultation); Gooch v. Spradling, 523
S.W.2d 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (statute providing that an arrested person shall be permitted to
consult with an attorney construed to give defendants a limited right to consult an attorney before
chemical testing); Siegwald v. Curry, 40 Ohio App. 2d 313, 319 N.E.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1974)
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the custody of the police the right to confer with an attorney. 119
Although courts have recognized a statutory right to consult an
attorney, all three states have limited the right to one of
reasonableness. 120 Two courts refused defendants the right to
counsel when the attempt to confer or the actual consultation with
counsel caused an undue delay in the administration of or
submission to the chemical test.' 2 1 Undue delay has also been a
factor in rejecting the right to counsel when the courts have decided
22
the issue upon the grounds of fairness. 1
The right to counsel was qualified in New York when a court
ruled that the right to consult an attorney must be afforded only
1 23
after the defendant "has requested the assistance of a lawyer.'
Another court limited the right to counsel to an opportunity to
contact an attorney and did not extend it to the right to have
24
counsel actually present. 1

Three states have incorporated the right to consult counsel
into their implied consent statutes, thus relieving the courts of the
duty to make the ultimate decision. 1 25 In 1977, amendments to the
North Carolina 126 and Vermont 12 7 implied consent statutes added a
(request to submit to chemical test fell within statute, which required that after arrest or taking into
custody of a person, such person shall be permitted facilities to communicate with an attorney).
119. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 481.10 (1976), construed in 247 N.W.2d 385, 391 (Minn. 1976); Mo.
Sup. CT. TRAFFIC R. 37.89 (1977), construed in 523 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.20 (1971), construed in40 Ohio App. 2d 313, -, 319 N.E.2d 381,384 (Ct.
App. 1974).
120. Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 394; Gooch, 523 S.W.2d at 866-67; Siegwald, 40 Ohio App. 2d at
,319 N.E.2d at 385.
121. Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 394; Siegwald, 40 Ohio App. 2d at __, 319 N.E.2d at 385.
122. Hall v. Secretary of State, 60 Mich. App. at 434, 231 N.W.2d at 399.
123. People v. Craft, 28 N.Y.2d 274, 279, 270 N.E.2d 297, 300, 321 N.Y.S.2d 566, 570 (1971).
124. Spradlingv. Deimeke, 528 SW.2d 759, 763-64 (Mo. 1975).
125. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 subd. 2(b) (West Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)
(1978); VT.STAT. ANN. tit. 23, 5 1202(c) (1981).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a) (1978). Section 20-16.2(a) of the North Carolina General
Statutes states in part:
The person arrested shall forthwith be taken before a person authorized to administer
a chemical test and this person shall inform the person arrested both verbally and in
writing and shall furnish the person a signed document setting out:
(1) That he has a right to refuse to take the test;
(2) That refusal to take the test will result in revocation of his driving privilege for six
months;
(3) That he may have a physician, qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse or
other qualified person of his own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in
addition to any administered at the direction of the law-enforcement officer; and
(4) That he has the right to call an attorney and select a witness to view for him the
testing procedures; but that the test shall not be delayed for this purpose for a
period in excess of 30 minutes from the time he is notified of his rights.
Id.
127. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(c) (Supp. 1982). Title 23, section 1202(c) of the Vermont
Statutes Annotated provides the following:
(c) A person who is requested by a law enforcement officer to submit to a test
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section allowing the motorist to call an attorney prior to deciding
whether to submit to a chemical test. The North Carolina statute
requires the administrator of the test to inform the defendant, both
verbally and in writing, of his statutory right to counsel prior to
administering the test.' 2 8 The Vermont statute merely states that
the motorist "shall have the right to consult an attorney prior to
deciding.' 1 29 In 1978, following the Minnesota Supreme Court
decision in Prideaux v. State Department of Public Safety, 130 the
Minnesota Legislature also amended its implied consent statute to
include the right to consult counsel. 131
The recent decisions by the various state courts, along with the
newly revised statutes mentioned above, are an indication of a new
tendency to grant the motorist a right to consult counsel in the
implied consent situation. If this trend continues, the present
majority view under Schmerber will become obsolete.
IV. NORTH DAKOTA'S IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE
North Dakota's

implied consent statute was enacted

in

1959.132 At present, the statute encompasses fourteen sections in
which is intended to be introduced into evidence, under this section shall have the
right to consult an attorney prior to deciding whether or not to submit to such a test.
The person must decide within a reasonable time, but no later than thirty minutes
from the time of the initial attempt to contact the attorney, whether or not to submit to
the evidentiary test. If the person submits toan evidentiary test, he shall have also the
right to have a blood test administered at his expense. Arrangements for the blood test
shall be made by the person submitting to the evidentiary breath test, or by his
attorney or some other person acting on his behalf except where the person is detained
in custody after administration of the evidentiary test, in which case the law
enforcement officers having custody of the person shall make arrangements for
administration of the blood test upon demand.
Id.
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)(1978).
129. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(c)(Supp. 1982).
130. 247 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1976). In Prideauxthe court held that any person who was required
to decide whether to submit to a chemical test under the implied consent law had a statutory right to
consult with an attorney before making his decision. Id. at 391-93.
131. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 subd. 2(b) (West Supp. 1981). The statute provides the
following:
(b) At the time a chemical test specimen is requested, the person shall be informed:
(I) that if testing is refused, the person's right to drive will be revoked for a period
of six months; and
(2) that if a test is taken and the results indicate that the person is under the
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, the person will be subject to criminal
penalties and the person's right to drive may be revoked for a period of 90 days; and
(3) that the person has a right to consult with an attorney but that this right is
limited to the extent that it cannot unreasonably delay administration of the test or the
person will be deemed to have refused the test; and
(4) that after submitting to testing, the person has the right to have additional
tests made by a person of his own choosing.

132. 1959 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 286, S 1.
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chapter 39-20 of the North Dakota Century Code.1 33 In compliance
with Schmerber v. California, the North Dakota implied consent
statute requires a lawful arrest prior to the request to submit to any
134
chemical test to determine a motorist's blood-alcohol content.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has supported this provision
in numerous decisions, which acknowledge the need for a lawful
arrest prior to any request to submit to a chemical test. 135 For the
arrest to be lawful under the statute, the officer making the arrest
must show reasonable cause. 136 This provision of the North Dakota
implied consent law reflects the majority opinion in Schmerber. 137
The North Dakota statute, although resembling implied consent
laws that have been enacted in other states, is distinctive in certain
aspects. The following sections will discuss these distinctions and
focus on the advantages and disadvantages to the North Dakota
motorist.
A.

CHOICE OF TESTS

Section 39-20-01 of the North Dakota Century Code
authorizes the use of blood, breath, saliva, or urine tests and gives
the arresting officer the right to determine which test or tests to use
in ascertaining the alcohol content of a motorist's blood.' 3 8 Giving
the officer the right to determine which tests are used advances the
133. N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-20-01 to -14 (1980). Section 39-20-01 provides as follows:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall
be deemed to have given consent subject to the provisions of this chapter to a chemical
test, or tests, of his blood, breath, saliva, or urine for the purpose of determining the
alcoholic content of his blood. The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of
a law enforcement officer only after placing such person except persons mentioned in
section 39-20-03 under arrest and informing him that he is or will be charged with the
offense of driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the public
highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The arresting officer shall
determine which of the aforesaid tests shall be used.

Id. §39-20-01.
134. Id. S 39-20-01; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 768-69.
135. Asbridge v. North Dakota Highway Comm'r, 291 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1980) (a lawful
arrest is a condition precedent to the administration of a chemical test); Smestad v. Ellingson, 191
N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1971) (all that is required is a valid arrest; a subsequent acquittal is immaterial);
McDonald v. Ferguson, 129 N.W.2d 348 (N.D. 1964) (a lawful arrest is a condition precedent to
right of officer to demand that motorist submit to chemical tests prescribed by implied consent law).
136. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04 (1980). Section 39-20-04 states that the officer must show
that he has reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. Id. See City of Minot v. Knudson, 184 N.W.2d 58, 64 (N.D. 1971) (statute
governing arrest without warrant permits officer to arrest a person for driving while under the
influence of alcohol, so long as officer has made arrest upon reasonable cause); Borman v. Tschida,
171 N.W.2d 757, 759 (N.D. 1969) (implied consent statute is complied with if officer had reasonable
grounds to believe that petitioner had been driving while under the influence); Coiling v. Hjelle, 125
N.W.2d 453, 460-61 (N.D. 1963) (arrest must be made "with reasonable grounds to believe"
motorist was driving while intoxicated).
137. 384 U.S. at 770.
138. N.D, CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1980).
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intent of the statute, which is to permit the use of available tests,
because the officer is most aware of the tests his department is
equipped to give. 139 Furthermore, granting the choice to the
motorist may result in a request for a test that is not readily
available. 140 In essence, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held
that even an agreement by the motorist to take another of the
designated tests to measure blood-alcohol content is a refusal when
the arresting officer chooses to administer a different test. 141
Although most states have not ruled on the question of who
may determine which test is to be administered, those states that
have dealt with the question are split as to who may make the
decision. A few states give the accused almost total freedom to
choose any test that is available. 42 Other states do not give the
accused such freedom, but do allow him to avoid the blood test if he
so chooses.1 43 For example, a Michigan statute144 provides that the
motorist must be advised that he has the option to submit only to a
breath test and refusal to submit to any other test shall not
constitute a refusal. 145 It should be noted that although a state
might allow the motorist to select the test, the motorist must be
reasonable in his choice. The motorist's demand for a test that is
46
not available may constitute a refusal to submit. 1
The other states that have decided the question of who should
choose the test have given the law enforcement agency or officer the
right to choose. 14 These states have discovered that the technical
equipment used to administer all the tests is not found throughout
139. Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359, 363 (N.D. 1961). Decided before the statutory
amendment, Timm v. State held that the exact test to be given is to be determined by the arresting
officer and not by the person to be tested. Id. After the amendment was enacted, the court reaffirmed
the Timm decision in Clairmont v. Hjelle, 234 N.W.2d 13 (N.D. 1975). The court in Clairmontstated
that the officer had the right to specify the use of one of the authorized tests. Id. at 16.
140. 110 N.W.2d at 363.
141. Clairmont v. Hjelle, 234 N.W.2d at 15.
142. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE 5 13353(a) (West Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
1312 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 751 (West Supp. 1981).
143. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.625a (6) (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123
subd. 2 (West 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 39-669.09 (1978).
144. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. 5 257.625a(6) (1981). Section 257.625a(6) of the Michigan
Compiled Laws Annotated states in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, a person requested to take this
test shall be advised that he or she has the option to demand that only a breath test
shall be given, in which case his or her refusal to submit to another test shall not
constitute a refusal....
Id.
145, Id.
146. State v. Manley, 189 Neb. 415, 202 N.W.2d 831 (1972) (defendant refused officer's
request for a blood or urine test but offered to take a breath test; because breath equipment was not
available, his conditional or qualified consent constituted refusal).
147. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 28-691A (Supp. 1981); IOWA CoDE ANN. 5 321B.3 (West
Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-20-01 (1980); UTAH CODE
ANN. 5 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202 (1981).
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the state. 148 Therefore, the law officer must be able to request that
the motorist submit to the test that is available at the time. 149
It appears, therefore, that giving the motorist an absolute right
to choose the test allows the accused to escape without a test if the
test he chooses is not available. On the other hand, allowing the
officer or agency to choose the test forces the accused, who may not
object to another test, to submit to a test that may offend his moral,
religious, or philosophical beliefs. A statute that gives the accused a
choice of readily available tests allows both the state and the
accused a degree of control over the administration of the test.
The Minnesota legislature has included an innovative
provision in its implied consent statute. 150 The provision states that
"[a]ny person may decline to take a direct blood test and elect to
take either a breath or urine test, whichever is available and
offered." ' 15 1 This statute gives the accused the choice of available

tests, while relieving every agency of the expense of supplying
equipment for every test.
When the motorist is given no choice as to which test will be
used, the state's attempt to determine the motorist's alcohol
content may come into direct conflict with the individual's interest
in due process and fundamental fairness. A legislative scheme that
gives the accused the choice of submitting to the available tests
satisfies the countervailing interests of the state and the individual.
The North Dakota scheme, however, does not grant the accused
any choice as to which test will be used. 152 The legislature should,
therefore, examine the possiblity of granting the North Dakota
motorist some degree of control over his situation. A close
examination of the innovative Minnesota statute should be made
and a change in North Dakota's view toward this aspect of its
implied consent statute should be considered.
B.

RIGHT TO REFUSE

The United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California has
held that a compelled submission to a chemical test and the
admission into evidence of its results does not violate the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.15 3 It follows, then,

that a motorist suspected of driving while intoxicated has no
148. See Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 756 (1961); Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359
(N.D. 1961).
149. Lee, 187 Kan. at -, 358 P.2d at 769; Timm, 110 N.W.2d at 363-64.
150. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 169.123 subd. 2 (West Supp. 1981).
151. Id.
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1980).
153. 384 U.S. at 765.
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constitutional right to refuse to submit to a chemical test.
Nevertheless, a number of states have passed legislation giving the
accused the right to refuse. 5 4 North Dakota is such a state. Section
39-20-04 of the North Dakota Century Code states that if an
arrested person refuses to submit to a test, no test will be given. 155
The refusal question also arises in the context of a delay in the
administration of the chemical test. Generally, any undue delay in
consent constitutes a refusal to submit. 156 Furthermore, many
courts have ruled that a refusal, accompanied by a later consent,
will not be considered consent; the refusal therefore has been held
to stand.15 7 The Supreme Court of North Dakota, however, has
held that a refusal followed by a consent is permissible when no
undue delay is found and the validity of the test is not materially
affected. 158 In Lund v. Hjelle the accused motorist initially refused to
submit to a blood test, but within an hour informed the officer that
he would take a test. 1 9 The North Dakota court stated:
ITihe subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior
first refusal when the request is made within a reasonable
time after the prior first refusal; when such a test
administered upon the subsequent consent would still be
accurate; when testing equipment or facilites are still
readily available; when honoring a request for a test,
following a prior first refusal, will result in no substantial
inconvenience or expense to the police; and when the
individual requesting the test has been in police custody
and under observation for the whole time since his
arrest. 160
The above criteria must be strictly adhered to and any deviation
will cause the later consent to be null and void.' 6 1 By permitting a
154. See supra note 40.
155. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04 (1980). The statute provides in part: "If a person under
arrest refuses to submit to chemical testing, none shall be given, but the commissioner shall revoke
his license or permit to drive for a period of six months." Id.
156. See, e.g., Zidell v. Bright, 264 Cal. App. 2d 867, 71 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Ct. App. 1968); State
v. Palmer, 191 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1971); Harlan v. State, 113 N.H. 194, 308 A.2d 856 (1973).
157. See, e.g., In re Kotas, 261 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1977); Currier v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 20 Wash. App. 16, 578 P.2d 1325 (Ct. App. 1978).
158. Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1974). See also Zahtila v. Department of Revenue,
39 Colo. App. 8, 560 P.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1977).
159. 224 N.W.2d at 554.
160. Id. at 557.
161. Asbridge v. North Dakota Highway Comm'r, 291 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1980). The court
said that a police officer did not act unreasonably in refusing to administer a breathalyzer test to the
plaintiff when the plaintiff had been asked by the officer to submit to the test on three occasions and
refused. Later the plaintiff requested administration of the test, but only after he had consulted with
his attorney outside the police station. Id. at 750.
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motorist to reconsider his refusal to submit to a test, the rule
adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court, although the
minority rule, provides the accused with an additional safeguard
under the implied consent statute. As a result of this additional
safeguard, the North Dakota approach may be adopted by other
states in the future.
C.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that there is no
right to counsel during any proceedings under the North Dakota
implied consent statute. 162 The court in Borman v. Tschida held that
all proceedings under the implied consent law are civil in nature,
not criminal. 163 Recognizing the rule in Borman, the court in Agnew
v. Hjelle held that "refusing to submit to a chemical test until
counsel is consulted is an unreasonable refusal, there being no right
to counsel in a civil proceeding.' 1 64 Thus, North Dakota has
followed the United States Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v.
California in rejecting the contention that the motorist has a right to
consult counsel prior to submission to a chemical test.
Although a majority of courts have followed the Schmerber rule,
a growing number of states do allow the accused a right to consult
counsel prior to submission to a test. 65 A number of courts permit
the accused to consult counsel when the accused has the right to
refuse to submit to a chemical test. 1 6 Because the accused must
decide whether to submit to a test, courts have considered the right
to refuse a "critical stage" of the proceedings at which counsel
67
should be present to assist the accused. 1
The right to counsel, however,
is tempered by a
reasonableness standard in many states. Undue delay in the
administration of a test has been a significant factor in determining
whether to permit a motorist to consult counsel. 168 Courts have
162. Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1974); Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291 (N.D.
1974).
163. Borman v. Tschida, 171 N.W.2d 757, 764-65 (N.D. 1969). The court said that the purpose
of the implied consent law is to protect the public while traveling and not to punish the licensee. Id. It
merely prevents motorists from driving on the highways when to do so would be hazardous to others.
Id. at 765. Therefore, the court concluded that "the rights that the licensee may assert in a criminal
proceeding do not apply here." Id.
164. 216 N.W.2d at 298. This holding was reaffirmed in Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552, 556
(N.D. 1974).
165. Seesupra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
166. Seesupra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Hall v. Secretary of State, 60 Mich. App. 431,
-, 231 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Ct.
App. 1975); Prideaux v. Department of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 417, 247 N.W.2d 385, 394
(1976); Siegwald v. Curry, 40 Ohio Arm. 313, 319 N.E.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1974).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

held that the right to counsel, prior to submission, will be permitted
as long as the conference 69will not cause any undue delay in the
administration of the test. 1
North Dakota has given the accused the right to refuse to
submit to a test, thereby allowing the motorist to determine the
course of the subsequent proceedings. In order to best insure that
this decision will be an intelligent one, basic fundamental fairness
calls for the right to confer with counsel. Although North Dakota
presently does not allow the assistance of counsel in making the
decision, a movement in this direction may be implied from the fact
that North Dakota has recognized that a delay, which does not
affect the material results of a test, will not be held a refusal. 17 0
Thus, the adoption of a right to counsel prior to submission may
still fall within the objective of the North Dakota implied consent
law when it would not cause undue delay.
Even if a right to counsel proposal is rejected, the North
Dakota position regarding the Miranda warning should be altered.
Many motorists who are given the Miranda warning upon arrest
confuse the right to counsel under Miranda with their rights under
the implied consent laws. These motorists wrongly presume that
when they are given the Miranda warning they have a right to
counsel prior to submitting to a test. Some states recognize a
"confusion doctrine" 1 7 ' and require the officer to explain to the
motorist that the right to counsel does not apply to implied consent
tests. 172
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not recognized a
"confusion doctrine."'17 3 Rather, the court has held that the
Miranda warning is not applicable to implied consent situations;
therefore, the officer has no duty to explain that the accused has no
right to counsel. 17 4 The North Dakota position may, however, be
changing in view of recent decisions. In State v. Fields'7 5 the
169. See, e.g., Prideaux v. Department of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385
(1976). In Prideaux the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a motorist has the right to consult with
a lawyer before making his decision whether to submit to a test, provided that such consultation does
not unreasonably delay the administration of the test. Id. at 417, 247 N.W.2d at 394. The Minnesota
court held that vindication of the important right to consult counsel would not render the implied
consent law ineffective. Id. at 418, 247 N.W.2d at 395.
170. Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552, 557 (N.D. 1974).
171. See Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 267 Cal. App. 2d 545, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Ct.
App. 1968). The court held that having warned a motorist of his right to an attorney, the officer
should qualify his advice. Id. at __,
73 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
172. See State v. Severino, 56 Hawaii 378, 381, 537 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1975); Swan v.
Department of Pub. Safety, 311 So. 2d 498, 500 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190
Neb. 724, 729, 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973); State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, -,
376 A.2d 351, 353
(1977).
173. Hammeren v. North Dakota Highway Comm'r, 315 N.W.2d 679, 682 (N.D. 1982).
174. Id. at 681; Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291, 297 (N.D. 1974).
175. 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980).
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Supreme Court of North Dakota stated in dictum that if the officer
does give the Miranda warning, he should inform the motorist that
"if he refuses to take the test, whether by silence or negative
answer, his license is subject to suspension.'' 1 7 6 In Hammeren v.
North Dakota Highway Commissioner'77 the court continued to reject a
strict application of the "confusion doctrine" by refusing to adopt a
"per se" confusion rule. 78 However, the court did acknowledge
that confusion, as a question of fact, could arise if an accused is
given the Miranda warning, but is not informed that he has no right
to counsel before deciding whether to submit to the blood-alcohol
test. 179
As the trend moves toward permitting the motorist to consult
counsel prior to submitting to a chemical test, North Dakota should
review its position regarding this important right.

D.

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

Two sections of the North Dakota implied consent law, section
39-20-07 dealing with the admissibility of the results of the
chemical test' 80 and section 39-20-08 dealing with the admissibility
of the accused's refusal to submit to a chemical test,' 8 ' should be
discussed briefly.
Section 39-20-07 of the North Dakota Century Code provides
that evidence of the amount of alcohol in a person's blood as shown
by a chemical analysis of his blood, breath, saliva, or urine is
admissible in any civil or criminal trial involving acts alledgedly
committed by a motorist who was driving while intoxicated. 1 82
While many states have adopted this type of statute, 8 3 a number of
states limit the use of chemical tests to a specific type of proceeding, such as a criminal action 8 ' or a driving under the
influence of alcohol proceeding. 8 5 North Dakota, however, has not
176. State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404, 410 (N.D. 1980).
177. 315 N.W.2d 679.
178. Id.at 682.
179. Id. In Hammeren the plaintiff did not testify at the administrative hearing. The court
concluded, therefore, that since the plaintiff produced no evidence of his confusion at the time of his
arrest, the Highway Commissioner's finding of fact that the plaintiff was not confused was supported
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 683.
180. N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-20-07 (1980).
181. Id. S 39-20-08,
182. Id. § 39-20-07.
183. See, e.g., AtA. CODE S 32-5-192 (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.262 (West Supp.
1977); GA. CODE ANN. S 68A-902.1(h) (Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. S 321B.11 (West Supp.
1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-110 (Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1204(1978).
184. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:662 (West Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.121(2)

(1979); MIss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-39 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(3) (1981); N.C. GEN.
STAT. 5 20-139.1 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, S756 (West 1979); TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN.
art. 67011-5(3) (Vernon 1977).
185. See, e.g.,
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, 5 24(l)(e) (West Supp. 1980); N.H. REv. STAT.
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86
restricted the use of test results to a particular type of proceeding.
Rather, the test results are admissible in both civil and criminal
actions. 18 7 The North Dakota scheme thereby permits both the
state and the accused to use the chemical test results to their fullest
capacity.

Section 39-20-08 of the North Dakota Century Code provides
that when an accused motorist refuses to submit to a chemical test,
evidence of his refusal is admissible if the accused testifies in the
action. 188 The primary argument against the admissiblity of a
refusal as evidence is that it violates the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Courts have held, however, that since
chemical test evidence does not violate the privilege against selfincrimination, 18 9 evidence of a refusal to submit to a chemical test
does not violate the privilege.190 Although jurisdictions are divided
on the question,' 9' the majority of recent decisions appear to be
92
leaning toward admissibility. 1
The right to refuse to submit to a test also will affect the
admissibility of the evidence of that refusal. Generally, states that
do not allow a right to refuse hold that evidence of such a refusal by
the motorist is admissible. 193 States that give the accused a right to
ANN. § 262A:63 (1977). For a specific look at admissibility statutes regarding blood test results, see
Parker, Implied Consent: Is It Still a Viable Concept?A National Survey of the Admission of Blood-Alcohol Tests
in Nondrunk Driving Settings, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 635.
186. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (1980).
187. Id.
188. Id. § 39-20-08. Section 39-20-08 provides as follows:
If the person under arrest refuses to submit to the test or tests, proof of refusal
shall be admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts
alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical
control of a vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, provided the person shall first have testified in the action.
Id.
189. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The Schmerber Court stated that "[sjince the
blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's
testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not
inadmissible on privilege grounds." Id. at 765.
190. State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968). The court held that since bodily
evidence does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination, testimony of a refusal to give bodily
evidence does not violate the privilege. Id. at -, 211 So. 2d at 289.
191. For cases holding that evidence of refusal is admissible, see People v. Walker, 266 Cal.
App. 2d 562, 72 Cal. Rptr. 224 (Ct. App. 1968); State v. Holt, 261 Iowa 1089, 156 N.W.2d 884
(1968); State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968); City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 15
Ohio St. 2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968).
For cases holding that evidence of refusal is inadmissible, see State v. Munroe, 22 Conn. Supp.
321, 171 A.2d 419 (1961); State v. Schlinger, 299 Minn. 212, 216 N.W.2d 835 (1974); Sloan v.
State, 503 P.2d 580 (Okla. 1972); Saunders v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 17, 353 S.W.2d 419 (1962).
192. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979); State v. Vietor, 261 NeW.2d 828 (Iowa
1978); State v. Romell, 189 Neb. 705, 204 N.W.2d 573 (1973); People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100,
385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978); State v. Flannery, 31 N.C. App. 617, 230 S.E.2d 603
(Ct. App. 1976); Commonwealth v.Jones, 242 Pa. Super. 471, 364 A.2d 368 (1976).
193. See, e.g., People v. Mosher, 93 Misc. 2d 179, 402 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Town Ct. Monroe County
1978); People v. Smith, 79 Misc. 2d 172, 359 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Broome County Ct. 1974).

NOTE

refuse usually exclude evidence of any refusal. 194 This general rule
is reflected in the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State
v. Severson. 195 The Severson court reversed a lower court conviction
and held that evidence of the defendant's refusal was inadmissible
because of the statutory right of the accused to decide whether to
submit to a test. 196 It should be noted, however, that subsequent
legislation has changed the law in North Dakota. 197 At the present
time evidence of a refusal is admissible provided the accused
testifies. 198

The question of admissibility of a refusal as evidence is
occasionally resolved by state statute. Some states specifically
forbid the use of a refusal as evidence, 199 while other states provide
for the introduction of a refusal as evidence at trial.20 0 Additionally,
some states will permit evidence of a refusal to be admitted at trial,
even though they also allow the motorist to refuse to submit to a
test. 20

1

As previously stated, section 39-20-08 of the North Dakota

Century Code provides for the admissibility of evidence of an
accused motorist's refusal to submit to a test, provided the motorist
20 2
first testifies in the action.

The increasing acceptance of chemical tests to measure alcohol
content, and the increasingly severe attitude against drunk drivers
may be two reasons for the current trend toward admissibility of a
refusal as evidence. The refusal may be a key element in the
prosecution of a motorist and the admission of a refusal into
evidence would help accomplish the objective of the implied
consent statute.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note examines modern implied consent statutes. Since
the United States Supreme Court enumerated the prerequisites of
194. See, e.g., People v. Knutson, 17 111. App. 2d 251, 149 N.E.2d 461 (App. Ct. 1958); State v.
Oswald, 90 S.D. 342, 241 N.W.2d 566 (1976); State v. Parker, 16 Wash. App. 632, 558 P.2d 1361
(Ct. App. 1976). But seeState v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1968) (evidence of refusal of
motorist to submit to blood-alcohol test was admissable in involuntary manslaughter prosecution).
195. 75 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956).
196. State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316, 318 (N.D. 1956).
197. 1959 N.D. Sess. Laws ch.286, S8.
198. N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-20-08 (1980).
199. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT, ch. 95.5, 5 11-501(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90, S 24(1) (3) (West Supp. 1980).
200. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 28-692(H) (Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ch. 32, S 666
(West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, S 1312(B) (Supp. 1980). Seealso WASH. REV. CODE
S 46.61.506 (Supp. 1980) (language of prior statute rendering refusal evidence inadmissible
omitted).
201. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5A-194(c) (Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 28-692(H)
(Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE S 321B.11 (West Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ch. 32, S 666 (West Supp.
1980).
202. N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-20-08 (1980). Seealso R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. S 31-27-2(b)(1) (1979).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

a valid implied consent law in Schmerber v. California,2 0 3 state
legislatures and courts have dealt with many challenges to their
implied consent laws. A variety of modern changes and adaptations
have resulted from these challenges.
North Dakota's implied consent statute has borrowed many
innovative changes from other jurisdictions in addition to adopting
several modifications of its own. The North Dakota Legislature and
the North Dakota Supreme Court have, however, been slow to
adopt some needed changes in the implied consent law. Although
giving the motorist total freedom to choose any chemical test is
probably beyond rightful bounds, the motorist should at least have
a choice of the available tests. North Dakota has, thus far, failed to
permit the motorist any choice. Second, even though North Dakota
allows a motorist's refusal to submit to a test to be admitted as
evidence if the motorist testifies, it should adjust its statute to admit
the refusal as evidence in all cases. Most importantly, North
Dakota should amend its implied consent law and provide the
accused motorist a right to consult counsel prior to submission to a
chemical test. The decision to submit to a test is such a "critical
stage" of the proceeding that the motorist should be provided an
opportunity to consult counsel before making it. In the final
analysis, although the North Dakota implied consent statute is
fairly representative of statutes in other states, it is apparent that
modifications are necessary in sections of the law.

KEITH REISENAUER

203. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).

